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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to analyze the monetary policy rules in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland, with public debt as an additional explanatory 
variable. We estimate linear rules by the GMM estimation and non-linear rules, 
using the Markov-switching model. Our findings suggest that in the Czech 
Republic and Poland the monetary authorities respond to growing public debt 
by lowering interest rates, while in Hungary the opposite may be observed. 
Moreover, we distinguish between passive and active monetary policy regimes 
and find that the degree of interest rate smoothing is lower and the response of 
the central banks to inflation and/or output gap is stronger in an active regime. 
In the passive regime, the output gap seems to be statistically insignificant. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years many countries have witnessed a substantial increase in 
fiscal imbalances. The fiscal consolidation measures undertaken to counteract 
the worsening of fiscal situations has proven in many cases to be insufficient 
and/or ineffective. The perspectives are also not very optimistic taking into 
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account the ageing of the population in many countries, in particular in the more 
advanced ones.  
In this context the question arises about the consequences of the fiscal 
stance on the effectiveness of monetary policy. Monetary policy has undergone 
significant institutional changes during the recent decades, which substantially 
improved its quality. One of the most important changes is the institutional 
independence granted to the central banks. Independent monetary authorities 
should be able to conduct sound monetary policy, ensuring price stability, without 
being inclined or forced by the government to monetize the debt. However, this 
view was contradicted in the literature, firstly by an “unpleasant monetarist 
arithmetic” by Sargent and Wallace (1981), and then by the fiscal theory of the 
price level (Woodford 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2001; Sims 1994, 2001; Leeper 
1991; Cochrane 2000, 2001). According to these concepts, monetary policy is not 
sufficient to ensure price stability; a sound fiscal policy is also required. The FTPL 
claims that the intertemporal government budget constraint may be satisfied in two 
ways: through adjustment of the primary surplus – which is called the Ricardian or 
monetary dominant regime; or through the endogenous adjustment of the price 
level – which is called the non-Ricardian or fiscal dominant regime. Therefore, 
fiscal imbalances and a lack of adjustments in fiscal policy may threaten price 
stability. In this situation, even independent central banks may be forced to take 
the public finances and the possible impact of interest rate changes on government 
debt into account when deciding about interest rates.  
The literature on monetary-fiscal policy interactions is rich. Leeper (1991) 
introduced a theoretical DSGE model of monetary-fiscal interactions and 
showed that there exists a bounded unique rational expectations equilibrium if 
one of the policies is active and the other passive. Davig and Leeper (2006) 
estimated Markov-switching rules for monetary and fiscal policies in the USA 
and found numerous switches that allow to distinguish between those regimes 
with monetary and those regimes with fiscal policies being dominant. Davig and 
Leeper (2011), using the Markov-switching monetary and fiscal rules in the 
DSGE model, also showed that the results depend on the regimes of the two 
policies. Many of the empirical studies on monetary-fiscal interaction use the 
VAR analysis. For example, Muscatelli at al. (2002) used the VAR and Bayesian 
VAR models to examine the interactions between fiscal and the monetary 
policy, concluding that fiscal shocks had a significant effect. More recently, 
Franta et al. (2012), adopting a time-varying-parameter VAR approach, found 
that central banks started to offset debt-financed fiscal shocks by increasing 
interest rates after the adoption of the inflation targeting framework. 
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The aim of this paper is to verify whether fiscal policy stances may 
directly influence the interest rate-setting behavior of central banks. We analyze 
three central European countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In 
all these countries the public debt-to-GDP ratio has been on the rise throughout 
the 2000s. The attempts to improve the fiscal situation were ruined by the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis. The most serious fiscal problems were 
experienced by Hungary, although it seems that it is the only country analyzed in 
the paper that was successful in stabilizing the debt. 
All the examined central European countries are inflation targeters with 
independent central banks, and their primary goal is to achieve price stability. 
Therefore, we would expect that the inflation rate would be their primary concern, 
i.e. inflation would be a significant variable with a high coefficient in the 
estimated monetary policy rule. However, if the monetary authorities perceive the 
public finances as unsustainable and threatening the overall macroeconomic 
stability, or price stability in particular, they may also respond to changes in the 
debt ratio. Therefore, we estimate the Taylor rules for these countries, where the 
short-term interest rate set by the central bank is explained by the lagged interest 
rate (interest rate smoothing), expected inflation, the output gap, and the changes 
in the general government debt-to-GDP ratio. We use two methods of estimation: 
the GMM and Markov-switching methods, as we allow for monetary policy 
regime switches. Our results suggest that the central banks in the Czech Republic 
and Poland responded to growing debt by lowering interest rates, while the 
Hungarian central bank acted in the opposite way. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents 
the possible explanations of the direct impact of public debt on interest rates set by 
the central banks. Section 3 describes data, methodology and estimation results, and 
the final section offers some conclusions. 
2. Monetary policy rates and public debt 
In this section we present arguments for the possible relationship between 
interest rates set by the central banks and the public debt stock. According to the 
standard view, monetary policy should tighten when fiscal policy loosens, 
ceteris paribus. Changes in fiscal policy affect output and the medium-term 
inflation prospects, to which monetary policymakers respond. In this sense the 
impact is indirect. It seems, however, that two other possible explanations of this 
relationship, more direct, may be derived from the literature: a debt management 
issue and a financial stability issue. 
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We have already alluded to the fiscal theory of the price level, according 
to which high public debt may result in higher price levels. According to this 
theory, such a situation may occur if the public debt is unsustainable, i.e. the 
intertemporal government budget constraint is not fulfilled. For public debt 
sustainability the relativity between interest rates and growth is important. If 
there are not many possibilities for the public finances to generate surplus – 
which can be a problem in times of economic slowdown – interest rates higher 
than growth will lead to a continuous increase in debt in relation to GDP. This 
brings us to the relationship between interest rates and the public debt. Goodhart 
(2012) concluded that in the face of low economic growth the only way to 
prevent the public debt from exploding, in particular in peripheral countries, is to 
set low interest rates, lowering the interest payments on outstanding debt. 
Goodhart (2012) explains that high deficits and public debt levels make fiscal 
sustainability a concern for central banks, which may take into account the possible 
effect of interest rate changes on the burden of the interest payments on the public 
sector. He predicts that in the coming years monetary policy and debt management 
will become closely interrelated, and that the times when monetary and fiscal policy 
were independent and separated were only temporary in central banking. 
Debt management issues may, however, be further complicated when  
a significant part of public debt is denominated in foreign currency. In this case 
decreasing interest rates will lead to currency depreciation, increasing the value 
of the foreign debt expressed in domestic currency. 
Taking into account these considerations, we may conclude that monetary 
policymakers may be concerned about fiscal stability issues and take public debt 
into consideration when deciding about the level of interest rates, however the 
direction of the relationship between interest rates and the public debt is 
ambiguous when a high share of the debt is denominated in foreign currency. 
Some authors postulate that monetary policy should respond to asset 
prices, or more generally, to financial stability. There are numerous studies 
discussing this issue on theoretical as well as empirical grounds. Baxa et al. (2013) 
provide an excellent survey of the existing literature in the field. They also 
estimate monetary policy rules for several central banks using the financial stress 
indicator as one of variables to which monetary policy responds. Moreover, they 
use a time-varying framework to capture changes in the strength of the reaction. 
They find that the interest rate setting behaviour of the central banks is affected by 
high financial stress. For the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Vašíček 
(2012) conducted a similar study using the threshold model with the financial 
stress indicator as one of the threshold variables. His results suggest that in the 
Czech Republic and Poland the central banks respond to financial stress by 
                                                    Are Central Banks In CEE Countries...                                        39 
decreasing interest rates, while in Hungary the central bank increases interest rates 
in the face of financial stress.  
While there is empirical evidence that monetary policy responds to 
financial stress and tries to ensure financial stability, fiscal sustainability and 
financial stability are strictly related. For example, Shirakawa (2012) describes 
the potential impact of an increase in government debt on financial stability and 
price stability, and Hellebrandt et al. (2012) state that “there is no question that 
price and financial stability depend upon the maintenance of fiscal stability.” We 
may, therefore, conclude that central banks may directly respond to the changes 
in the public debt level for financial stability reasons.  
3. Monetary policy rules with public debt 
In this study we estimate the monetary policy rule, originally proposed by 
Taylor (1993), and we expand the set of standard variables measuring the 
economic imbalances to which the central banks may possibly respond, by 
adding the public debt. For the reasons explained above we do not form 
expectations about the sign of the relationship. 
As the relationship between interest rates and public debt may run in both 
directions (negative and positive), the impact of public debt on interest rates may 
change over time, depending on the monetary policy regime. For this reason, we 
estimate the monetary policy rules using the GMM, which allows for corrections 
of possible endogeneity, as well as the Markov-switching model, which allows 
for changes of monetary policy regimes. 
3.1. Data 
The time span of the analysis ranges from 1998:q1 to 2014:q2 (in the case 
of the Czech Republic the sample period is 1999:q1 to 2013:q11). We use 
quarterly data, as Vašíček (2012) suggests, in order to avoid problems with the 
high persistency of some variables, such as inflation and interest rates, and noise in 
the data at monthly frequency. The dependent variable is the quarterly average of 
the main policy interest rate set by the three analyzed central banks. As Arlt and 
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 In the case of the Czech Republic the sample used for the estimation is shorter than for the 
two remaining countries and ends in first quarter of 2013. We decided to shorten the sample 
because since 2 November 2012 the Czech National Bank has maintained its two-week repo rate at 
a level that is considered to be the binding lower band on short-term nominal interest rates. 
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Mangel (2014) argue, in many empirical studies on monetary policy rules the 
interest rates set by the central banks are approximated by the interbank money 
market interest rates; yet, in such a case the behaviour of the money market is 
tested rather than the interest rate setting behaviour of the central banks. 
Arlt and Mangel (2014) also criticize the use of the future inflation rate as 
the explanatory variable in forward-looking Taylor rule estimations, which is 
common in empirical studies. They point out that the currently set interest rate 
influences the future inflation rate, which may actually be different than 
forecasted at time of making the interest rate decision. On the other hand, the 
estimation of forward-looking, rather than backward-looking, Taylor rules seems 
to be justified in the case of inflation-targeting countries. The best solution 
would be the choice of conditional inflation projections, but such data are not 
available for all the three central banks for the whole period. Therefore, we try to 
avoid the problem by using the inflation expectations of commercial banks’ 
analysts formed for the period 12 months ahead (in the case of Hungary – for the 
end of the next year).2 For Hungary and Poland the source of the data is Reuters, 
for the Czech Republic we rely on the data from the Czech National Bank 
survey of financial analysts. As the frequency of the data is monthly, we use 
quarterly averages.  
As the measure of the output gap we use the difference between the 
logarithm of real GDP and its trend obtained by the HP filter. For the foreign 
interest rate we use the interest rate set by the European Central Bank as the main 
central bank in the region. The exchange rate is measured as the deviation of the 
logarithm of the real effective exchange rate from the trend obtained by the HP 
filter (quarterly data obtained from Eurostat).  
Finally, we use seasonally adjusted quarterly data on the general 
government debt-to-GDP ratio. The unit root tests indicated the existence of a unit 
root in the time-series in the case of all three countries, and therefore the 
government debt is incorporated in the Taylor rule equation as the first difference. 
The source of the data is Eurostat. Below the descriptive statistics of the data are 
presented. 
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 Mackiewicz-Łyziak (2016) estimates Taylor rules for the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland using past inflation, future inflation, and inflation expectations and finds that in the case of 
these countries forward-looking Taylor rules describe monetary policy in a better way. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for variables used for the Taylor rule estimation 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. dev. 
Czech Republic 
Interest rate 0.0247 0.0217 0.0549 0.005 0.0158 
Inflation 
exp. 0.0297 0.0276 0.0477 0.0163 0.0081 
Output gap -0.0010 -0.0030 0.0440 -0.0271 0.0190 
Debt (diff.) 0.0226 0.0200 0.0710 -0.0270 0.0249 
Exchange 
rate 0.0025 -0.0024 0.0957 -0.0568 0.0353 
Hungary 
Interest rate 0.090 0.0813 0.2017 0.0249 0.0390 
Inflation 
exp. 0.0465 0.0415 0.1175 0.0200 0.0209 
Output gap -0.0003 -0.0022 0.0361 -0.0406 0.0165 
Debt (diff.) 0.0124 0.0090 0.1540 -0.0620 0.0428 
Exchange 
rate 3.57E-13 0.0018 0.0996 -0.1087 0.0376 
Poland 
Interest rate 0.0774 0.0525 0.2383 0.0250 0.0562 
Inflation 
exp. 0.0372 0.0277 0.1072 0.0184 0.0221 
Output gap -0.0001 -0.0011 0.0252 -0.0207 0.0119 
Debt (diff.) 0.0081 0.0125 0.0690 -0.0820 0.0315 
Exchange 
rate 2.36E-13 0.0033 0.1692 -0.1573 0.0659 
Common 
ECB int. 
Rate 0.0234 0.0234 0.0475 0.0023 0.0125 
Source: Own calculations. 
3.1. Results of the GMM estimation 
This section presents the estimated monetary policy reaction functions. The 
estimated rules are forward-looking, in the sense that they include forecasted 
inflation rates. Other variables – the output gap and the public debt – enter the 
equation either lagged by one period or as a value in the current period. Moreover, 
we assume the interest rate smoothing behaviour of the central banks (as suggested 
by Judd and Rudebusch (1998)), so the interest rate equation includes its past value. 
The way in which inflation should enter the Taylor rule in the case of the 
three examined countries is not obvious. All three countries are inflation targeters, 
with explicitly set inflation targets. In such a case it seems reasonable to include 
the inflation gap in the monetary policy rule, that is, the difference between the 
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inflation rate and the inflation target, rather than inflation alone. However, the 
countries adopted the inflation targeting framework amidst high inflation, with  
a view to stabilizing inflation expectations and bringing inflation down. Initially, 
the inflation targets were set for the end of the year and were gradually lowered. 
As the primary aim of the new monetary policy strategy at the early stages of 
inflation targeting was to reduce inflation, the downward deviations of inflation 
from the inflation target were frequently not corrected. Therefore, we would 
observe no interest rate reduction in response to the negative inflation gap, because 
the true and ultimate inflation target of the central bank was lower. For this reason 
we decided to estimate the Taylor rules with the inflation rate rather than the 
inflation gap.  
At the first stage of the study, the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) is used to deal with the possible endogeneity introduced by the forward-
looking variable. Following Sznajderska (2014), we add the ECB’s interest rate 
and the real effective exchange rate (the deviation from the trend), to the set of 
instruments consisting of lagged explanatory variables (we use two lags of each 
variable).3 As explained above, in the case of small open economies these two 
variables may influence the interest rate setting behaviour of the central banks. 
The estimations were obtained with the Newey-West covariance estimator, 
allowing for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC weighting matrix). 
Table 2 presents the results of the estimation. 
Table 2. GMM estimates of the monetary policy rules 
 Czech Republic Hungary           Poland 
Const. -0.01*** (0.001) 
-0.01* 
(0.004) 
-0.01*** 
(0.003) 
Interest rate(-1) 0.83*** (0.03) 
0.77*** 
(0.10) 
0.71*** 
(0.06) 
Inflation 0.35*** (0.08) 
0.58** 
(0.23) 
0.96*** 
(0.21) 
Output gap 0.01 (0.02) 
0.26*** 
(0.04) 
-0.11 
(0.10) 
Debt (first diff.) -0.04*** (0.01) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
R2 0.99 0.92 0.99 
Prob(J-stat) 0.28 0.76 0.10 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis; *, **, and *** denote statistical significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively; Prob(J-stat) denotes the p-value of the Sargan test for over-identification. 
Source: own calculations. 
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 Foreign interest rates enter the Taylor rule for CEE countries, for example in Vašíček (2010) 
and Arlt and Mangel (2014). 
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The results show that in all the analyzed countries the estimated smoothing 
parameter (the coefficient on the lagged interest rate) is rather high, with the 
highest value for the Czech Republic and the lowest for Poland. All the central 
banks actively respond to the inflation forecast, yet the strength of the response is 
also different for different countries: the weight of the inflation forecast in the 
monetary policy rule is the highest in the case of Narodowy Bank Polski (the 
National Bank of Poland) and lowest in the case of the Czech National Bank.4 The 
only central bank that seems to also actively respond to output fluctuations during 
the analyzed period is the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the National Bank of Hungary). 
What is interesting from the point of view of this study is the response of 
the central banks to the growth of debt stock. It seems that all three central banks 
react to the changes in government debt. However, the central banks differ in the 
direction of their reactions: in the case of the CNB and NBP the reaction is 
negative, while in the case of the MNB the reaction is positive. This may reflect 
the fact that although all the countries witnessed a growing debt ratio, the situation 
in Hungary was the most difficult. The positive reaction of the central bank to 
growing debt may reflect the intention of the central bank to demonstrate that it is 
concerned about economic stabilization and its will to counteract the outflow of 
capital. Among the three analyzed countries, Hungary has the highest share of 
public debt denominated in foreign currency. In 2014 it constituted 39.7% of total 
debt, whereas in Poland and in the Czech Republic it was 35.2% and 14.3%, 
respectively.5 Only a year earlier, however, in 2013, the share of debt denominated 
in foreign currency in total debt was 42.1% in Hungary, 29.7% in Poland, and 
19.6% in the Czech Republic, so the differences between Hungary and the two 
remaining countries were significantly higher. 
On the other hand, the negative response of two other central banks may 
indicate the willingness of the central banks to engage in debt management. 
3.2. Results of Markov-switching estimation 
In the above estimation of the Taylor rule it is assumed that the Taylor 
rule is linear and the coefficients are constant. This assumption may be not 
satisfied in reality. Nonlinearities in Taylor rules may be the result of switches 
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 As a robustness check, we also estimated the Taylor rules with future inflation (two quarters 
ahead) as the explanatory variable. The qualitative results were very similar, with somewhat lower 
coefficients on inflation. 
5
 The source of data on the share of debt denominated in foreign currency in total debt is 
Eurostat. 
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between different regimes of monetary policy, i.e. the central banks’ preferences 
may not be stable over time and may change. In the context of regime switches 
in monetary policy, the estimation of the threshold models has become common 
in the literature. This approach was adopted, for example, by Vašíček (2012) in 
his aforementioned study for the three CEE countries, using the inflation gap, 
the output gap, and the financial stress index as threshold variables. Bunzel and 
Enders (2010) find evidence of the threshold effect in the Fed’s interest rate 
setting. Another approach to estimating the regime-switching Taylor rule is the 
use of the Markov switching model (Hamilton, 1989), which does not require 
determining the threshold variable and its threshold value. In this model the 
transition between states occurs according to some unobserved state variable with 
certain transition probabilities. Hutchison et al. (2013) use the Markov switching 
Taylor rule to distinguish between “Dove” and “Hawk” regimes in India, which 
they define as periods when the output gap is the primary concern of monetary 
policy and periods when inflation is of primary concern. Zheng et al. (2012) 
estimate the regime switching forward-looking monetary policy rule for China, 
distinguishing between two regimes: an inflation targeting regime and a regime 
with the central bank focusing mainly on the output gap. Mackiewicz-Łyziak 
(2016) estimates the regime switching Taylor rule for the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland and finds evidence for two monetary policy regimes: passive 
and active, with the passive regime characterized by a high degree of interest rate 
smoothing and low responsiveness to inflation and output, while in the active 
regime the smoothing parameter is lower and the importance of inflation and/or 
output gap is higher. 
In this section we take a similar approach to Hutchison et al. (2013), 
Zheng et al. (2012) and Mackiewicz-Łyziak (2016) and estimate the Markov-
switching Taylor rules for monetary policy in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland. We allow all the coefficients to change between regimes, as we want to 
assess the overall change in the central banks’ reactions to economic conditions. 
The estimation of the Markov switching model does not require any a priori 
knowledge about the regimes, such as choosing a threshold variable according to 
which regime changes occur, as in the threshold model. The regimes are 
estimated directly from the data. The change of regimes occurs according to 
some unobservable state variable, which may be interpreted as the state of the 
economy. The results of the estimations are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Markov-switching estimates of the monetary policy rules  
 Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
 Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 2 
Const. -0.003** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
0.02*** 
(0.006) 
-0.01*** 
(0.003) 
Interest 
rate(-1) 
0.86*** 
(0.07) 
0.76*** 
(0.03) 
0.72*** 
(0.004) 
0.76*** 
(0.08) 
0.49*** 
(0.06) 
0.81*** 
(0.05) 
Inflation  0.24*** 
(0.04) 
0.45*** 
(0.08) 
0.57*** 
(0.008) 
0.54*** 
(0.19) 
0.72*** 
(0.13) 
0.76*** 
(0.18) 
Output gap 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
0.19*** 
(0.002) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
1.12*** 
(0.14) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
Debt (first 
diff.) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02*** 
(0.0006) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
Log(sigma) -6.88*** 
(0.18) 
-6.54*** 
(0.21) 
-8.95*** 
(0.33) 
-4.78*** 
(0.15) 
-5.45*** 
(0.19) 
-6.02 
(0.13) 
P11 
P22 
0.73 
0.61 
0.21 
0.83 
0.85 
0.94 
Exp. dur. 3.8 2.6 1.3 5.8 6.6 16.6 
AIC 
Schwarz c. 
-9.51 
-9.01 
-6.98 
-6.50 
-8.06 
-7.58 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis; *, **, and *** denote statistical significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively; exp. dur. denotes expected duration of a given regime.  
Source: Own calculations. 
Following Mackiewicz-Łyziak (2016) we interpret the results as indicating 
the existence of active and passive monetary policy regimes. Generally, the active 
regime is characterized by stronger reactions of the central banks to inflation 
and/or the output gap and a lower smoothing parameter.6 In the Czech Republic, in 
the active regime the central bank responds stronger to inflation and starts paying 
attention to the output gap, although the weight attached to the output gap is lower 
than the weight of inflation. In the passive regime output gap developments are not 
statistically significant. In Hungary a similar behaviour may be observed: in the 
passive regime the central bank reacts only to inflation developments and in the 
active regime the reaction to inflation is slightly stronger and the central bank 
starts responding also to the output gap developments. The weight of inflation is 
also higher than the weight of the output gap. In Poland the change of the 
smoothing parameter between the regimes is the largest among all the analyzed 
countries. The change in the central bank’s behaviour between regimes is also  
a little different than in the other countries, namely in the active regime the output 
gap developments become statistically significant, similarly as in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, but the weight put by the NBP to the output gap is very 
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 It should be noted, however, that in the case of Hungary, the difference in the smoothing 
parameter between the regimes is not statistically significant, as indicated by the Wald test. 
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high and exceeds the weight of inflation, which, in turn, is slightly lower than in 
the passive regime (although the difference between the coefficients on inflation in 
the two regimes is not statistically significant). 
It should be noted that in all three countries inflation is always a significant 
variable in the monetary policy rule, regardless of the regime, and the output gap 
is significant in the active regime, and insignificant in the passive regime. In all 
these countries the passive regime seems to be the dominant one, as suggested by 
the estimated probabilities and the expected durations (see the Appendix for 
figures of the estimated regime probabilities). In the Czech Republic and Hungary 
they followed one another during the entire sample period, with the active regime 
lasting longer in the Czech Republic than in Hungary. In Poland the active regime 
dominated in the first half of the sample period, while in the second half only the 
passive regime occurred. 
The main difference between the countries is in the central banks’ responses 
to government debt. The estimation of the Markov-switching rules confirm our 
previous findings based on the GMM estimation in this respect. In Hungary the 
central bank responded to growing public debt by increasing the interest rate, 
while in the Czech Republic and Poland the opposite reaction was observed. These 
results are consistent with the findings of Vašíček (2012). This is not surprising, 
since fiscal sustainability and financial stability – expressed in Vašíček (2012) as 
the financial stress index – are strictly related. Moreover, in the Czech Republic 
and Poland the reaction to the changes in the government debt was statistically 
significant only in the passive regime, and in Hungary in the active regime. 
Therefore we may conclude that the CNB and the NBP react to government debt 
in the standard situation (passive regime), trying to lower the debt burden by 
cutting interest rates.  
4. Conclusions 
Goodhart (2012) presumes that an era of independent and separately 
conducted monetary and fiscal policy is coming to an end. Such arrangements in 
economic policy were only possible when public finances were under control. 
Since government deficits and debts have become a problem, central banks will 
have to engage in debt management to ensure fiscal and financial stability. 
In this study we added the fiscal variable – change in the government debt – 
to the standard set of variables explaining the interest rate setting behaviour of the 
central banks. The are several reasons why the central banks may want to react to 
the government debt. On one hand, the central bank may want to counteract the 
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loose fiscal policy and its consequences for the economy and tighten monetary 
conditions. It may also try to prevent instability in the financial markets in the face 
of growing fiscal imbalances. On the other hand, debt service costs increase along 
with rising interest rates, so a tight monetary policy would increase the burden of 
the debt. The central bank may be inclined to cooperate with the government and 
to ease its monetary policy when the public debt is high. The picture is further 
complicated when a large share of debt is denominated in foreign currency. In 
such a case the impact of the public debt on interest rate setting is ambiguous. 
Indeed, our results suggest that the relationship between central banks’ 
interest rates and the growth of government debt may be both positive as well as 
negative. All the three analyzed central banks: the CNB, the NBP and the MNB, 
responded to growing debt, but in the case of the Hungarian central bank the 
response was positive, while in the case of the other two central banks it was 
negative. The same conclusions were obtained using the GMM method as well as 
the Markov-switching estimation. These results are consistent with the findings of 
Vašíček (2012), who showed similar reactions of these central banks to the financial 
stress indicator. It seems that in the face of growing imbalances, the MNB reacts by 
tightening the monetary conditions, while the CNB and the NBP do the opposite. 
The rest of our findings are as follows. The central banks seem to switch 
between two monetary policy regimes – an active and a passive one – with the passive 
regime being dominant. The passive regime is characterized by higher degree of 
interest rate smoothing, weaker response to the expected inflation and no statistically 
significant reaction to the output gap. The higher relative weight of expected inflation 
than that of the output gap is confirmed by the GMM estimation of the linear Taylor 
rule. In the active regime, the weight of the expected inflation increases (with the 
exception of Poland) and the output gap becomes statistically significant.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests for the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio and the first difference of the debt-to-GDP ratio 
 Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
 Debt-to-GDP ratio 
ADF -1.10 -0.45 -1.18 
PP -0.84 -0.31 -1.23 
 First difference of debt-to-GDP ratio 
ADF -3.58*** -8.73*** -7.01*** 
PP -8.54*** -8.77*** -7.02*** 
Note: Test equations with intercept. *** denotes rejection of the null of a unit root on 1% level. 
Source: Own calculations. 
Figure A.1. Smoothed probabilities of the regimes 
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Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Streszczenie 
 
CZY BANKI CENTRALNE W KRAJACH EUROPY 
ŚRODKOWEJ REAGUJĄ NA DŁUG PUBLICZNY? 
 
Celem badania jest analiza reguł polityki pieniężnej w Czechach, Polsce i na 
Węgrzech, z długiem jako dodatkową zmienną objaśniającą. Estymowana jest liniowa 
reguła przy użyciu Uogólnionej Metody Momentów oraz reguła nieliniowa przy użyciu 
modelu przełącznikowego Markova. Wyniki badania sugerują, że w Czechach i Polsce 
władze monetarne reagowały na rosnący dług obniżaniem stóp procentowych, podczas gdy 
na Węgrzech reakcja była odwrotna. Ponadto, wyróżniamy pasywny i aktywny reżim polityki 
pieniężnej, przy czym reżim aktywny charakteryzuje się niższym stopniem wygładzania stóp 
procentowych i silniejszą reakcją banku centralnego na inflację i/lub lukę produktową.  
W reżimie pasywnym luka produktowa okazuje się być statystycznie nieistotna. 
 
Słowa kluczowe: polityka pieniężna, dług publiczny, reguła Taylora, zmiana reżimu 
 
